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How much to set aside? Alberta needs to set aggressive savings targets
for its resource wealth if it is to achieve intergenerational equity and
fiscal sustainability.
NO. 263, MAY 2008
FISCAL POLICYThe challenges that come with an abundant supply of resource wealth
present difficult fiscal decisions for the Alberta government. One highly
publicized concern is the need for the province to devise a long-run plan for
resource revenue savings. This study focuses on the appropriate measures
that fiscal planners must take to ensure the province's long-term fiscal
sustainability. The study uses a forward looking model, taking into account
the resource revenues Alberta can expect from its energy future, and targets
the equal distribution of government spending from resource wealth across
current and future generations of Albertans. The results of the model are
compared against the province's current ad-hoc budget rules to illustrate the
fiscal consequences of spending too much resource wealth upfront and not
saving enough for generations to come. 
We find that Alberta's current annual level of savings should be even more
aggressive than the Norway standard. The province should amalgamate its
savings funds; broaden the debate on the true impact of resource wealth on
annual budgets – through personal and corporate income taxes in addition
to royalties and leases – and aim to distribute the province's per capita
spending from resource wealth equally over time.
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THE STUDY IN BRIEFA
lberta has enjoyed
unprecedented prosperity
thanks to the recent run-up in
oil and natural gas prices. Between
1999 and 2006, direct resource
revenues accruing to the government
increased 152 percent, program
expenditures increased 80 percent
and the government paid off all
outstanding debt.1
Nonetheless, this state of affairs rests on a
precarious foundation of volatile revenues from
an exhaustible resource base. For this reason,
many Albertans are asking whether the province
has saved enough for the future. This question
has taken on particular importance in light of
recent media reports about the successful example
of Norway, an oil-rich country that places more
emphasis on saving its resource revenues than
Alberta.2 In order to address these concerns, we
will focus in this Commentary on the following
four questions:
• Has Alberta saved enough to date?
￿ What level of spending out of resource wealth
is sustainable, moving forward?
￿ What are the implications of such a
sustainable policy for provincial budget
planning?
￿ Should Alberta follow Norway’s example?
To answer these questions, policymakers must
first identify the principles that should guide
fiscal policy over the long run. In recent years, the
concept of sustainability has emerged as one such
principle.
Economists define fiscal sustainability in terms
of the Permanent Income Model, first proposed
by Milton Friedman in the 1950s. In recent
years, researchers working at the International
Monetary Fund have adapted this model for
resource-rich jurisdictions in a version we call the
Permanent Resource Income Model (PRIM). In
simple terms, PRIM identifies the highest level of
annual government spending that can be financed
indefinitely from resource wealth, given what is
known and expected about the resource
endowment.
We argue that this level should be calculated in
per capita terms in order to balance competing
objectives of intergenerational equity, economic
efficiency and fiscal prudence. The model deals
with the eventual exhaustion of the resource base
by building up sufficient financial wealth to
provide an alternative stream of future income.
Applying the model to Alberta yields the
following answers to our four questions:
￿ Alberta has, in fact, saved more than enough
to date compared with a hypothetical
sustainable policy implemented at the
beginning of oil and gas exploitation in 1948.
￿ Notwithstanding this positive result, the
province must now begin an aggressive savings
policy if it wishes to sustain a constant level of
per capita expenditure in the future. In
particular, given our reference forecast of
future revenues, the government must aim to
save an amount equal to 139 percent of direct
resource revenues over the next five years.
Failure to meet this target will lead to a
permanent decline in fiscal capacity this
century, as the resource base and revenues
diminish.3
￿ Alberta’s Fiscal Responsibility Act provides for
less than half the savings called for during the
next five years, and its relative performance
will deteriorate beyond that point. While
further increases in resource royalties may
help, our analysis suggests that the government
will also have to undertake a combination of
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The authors would like to thank Finn Poschmann, Robin Banerjee, Bev Dahlby, Yvan Guillemette and Maciej Kotowski for their helpful
comments on earlier drafts.
1 Figures based on data from Alberta (2007). 
2 See, for example, Saunders (2008) and Scoffield (2006).
3 Our forecasts show the resource base being depleted in 2095.spending cuts and increases in non-resource
tax levels.4
￿ The Permanent Resource Income Model is
conceptually different from the approach
followed by Norway. In particular, while
PRIM seeks to equalize per capita spending
over time, the Norwegian approach contains
an explicit bias in favour of future generations.
Nonetheless, under present circumstances,
PRIM actually calls for Alberta to save more
than the Norwegian approach, not less.
Beyond specific targets and values, PRIM
provides the ground rules for a process of
sustainable fiscal planning that any jurisdiction
can follow. At its centre is the idea that
government expenditure based on resource wealth
should be smoothed out over time so that all
citizens share equally in the resource bounty. 
In contrast, current debates over resource-
wealth spending usually revolve around the
government’s short-term record. In this vein,
Alberta has in recent years legislated fiscal rules to
eliminate deficits and constrain the budgeting
process.5 While these rules have proven useful as
statements of the government’s budgeting
priorities, they are, in general, too ad hoc to
provide long-lasting guidance on fiscal policy.
Indeed, their history is one of constant revision as
new developments render yesterday’s rules
obsolete. Unfortunately, repeated revisions have
led to increased complexity, including a
proliferation of savings funds. This complexity
has reduced the transparency of the budgeting
process and does not serve Albertans well.
The Permanent Resource Income Model,
however, provides a comprehensive and clear
framework for guiding long-term fiscal policy.
The model supersedes all other fiscal rules. It also
calls for the consolidation of Alberta’s various
savings funds, thus increasing the transparency of
the budgeting process and the public accounts.
Fiscal Sustainability 
The debate over managing resource revenues
revolves around the following key questions: how
much should be saved in any given year? and how
much should be spent for the immediate benefit
of citizens (i.e. program spending)? By saving, we
mean payment of interest or principal, if the
government is a net debtor, or accumulation of
financial assets, if it is a net creditor.6
We interpret sustainability to mean that a given
policy can be continued at the current level
indefinitely. It follows that sustainability requires
a shift of focus from the short term to the long
term. Short-term thinking about fiscal policy
revolves around the current budget balance. In
contrast, long-term thinking focuses upon the
government’s total wealth — in particular
whether this wealth is adequate to support a long-
term fiscal plan of which the current budget
balance is only one element. For this purpose, the
government’s total wealth consists of two
components: its financial position (the difference
between assets and liabilities); and the present
value of future revenue streams.
Economists interpret fiscal sustainability in
terms of the Permanent Income Model of budget
planning, originally developed by Friedman
(1957). Permanent income is defined as the
annuity value of total wealth. In effect, it is as if
the government could invest its total wealth
(including the rights to future streams of revenue)
in the bond market and receive an annual return
on the investment. Permanent income indicates
the amount that can be spent in a year consistent
with maintaining total wealth constant.7 Spend
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4 Our estimation of the sustainable benchmark already takes into account the increases in royalty rates announced following the 2007 Alberta
Royalty Review Panel. 
5 See Kneebone (2006) for a history of such rules in Alberta.  
6 We include debt interest payments in the saving envelope, although it is conventional to account for them as current expenditure. Interest
payments represent a transfer from taxpayers to bond holders and thus do not provide a net benefit for society in the period in which they are
made.
7 In fact, following Engel and Valdes (2000), what we have here is a special case of the Permanent Income Model in which the agent’s
subjective discount rate is equal to the (exogenous) real interest rate.more than this amount and wealth will fall; spend
less and wealth will grow. Thus permanent
income corresponds with the maximum annual
spending level that can be maintained
indefinitely, assuming nothing changes.
When assessing fiscal sustainability for
resource-based economies, economists typically
narrow the focus of the model to resource-based
wealth only; i.e., financial assets plus the present
value of future resource revenues.8 For this
purpose, we denote spending from resource
wealth9 as GR. We take the view that all
Albertans, including those yet to be born, are
entitled to an equal share of resource-based
spending. Therefore, we define fiscal
sustainability in terms of the maximum constant
value of GR per capita. By definition, this value is
equivalent to permanent resource income per
capita, which is the annual return on per capita
resource wealth.
In a given year, resource revenue may be less
than or greater than GR. If less, then the
difference is covered by either investment income
or borrowing. If greater, the surplus is savings.
The role of borrowing springs from the fact that
resource revenues do not, in general, flow at a
constant rate. In particular, if revenues start out
low at the beginning of extraction and increase
over time, the Permanent Resource Income
Model entails borrowing against future revenues
at the outset, then paying off the debt and
building positive wealth later when revenues are
greater. This way, all generations can enjoy the
same level of spending per capita from the
resource base, despite variations in the revenue
flow. In the long run, it is important to build
significant financial wealth to provide a base for
continued spending once the resource base is
exhausted. Thus, over time, the flow of resource
revenue is replaced by a flow of investment
income, as in-ground wealth is converted into
financial wealth.
This blending of borrowing and saving is
analogous to household financial planning. When
income is temporarily low, the household may
borrow against future earnings; when income is
unexpectedly high, the household may save the
surplus. And, ultimately, the household will
probably wish to accumulate adequate financial
wealth to provide for spending during retirement.
In this context, debt is not a bad thing, because it
is manageable within a long-term plan.
There are, however, other perspectives on fiscal
sustainability. Tersman (1991), for one, defines
sustainability in terms of a constant ratio of GR
to non-resource GDP. Assuming non-resource
GDP grows over time, this rule entails that GR
grows at the same rate. Further, if non-resource
GDP grows faster than the population, it follows
that GR must also grow faster than the
population. While such growth may seem
attractive, it comes with a price. In particular,
compared with the constant path we propose, GR
per capita in Tersman’s framework must start out
lower, with more of the resource revenue saved in
every period. Consequently, this growth in GR
per capita benefits future generations at the
expense of early generations. In light of the fact
that future generations will also benefit from
higher non-resource GDP per capita in this
scenario, we see no ethical basis for skewing
resource-based spending in their favour as well.
Engel and Valdes (2000) point out that even
constant GR per capita may be too generous for
future generations since, as mentioned, they will
likely benefit from higher non-resource GDP per
capita. With this in mind, they propose that
resource wealth be used to compensate earlier
generations for lower non-resource incomes. This
approach entails a declining path of GR per capita.10
Fiscal policy must also take into account the
impacts of taxation and uncertainty. A constant
or declining path of GR per capita must be
accompanied by an increasing path of non-
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8 See, for example, Tersman (1991), Liuksila et al. (1994), Davoodi (2002) and Barnett and Ossowski (2002).
9 We use spending out of resource wealth, resource-based spending, resource spending and resource expenditure synonymously.
10 Engel and Valdes present two such models. The first is a full application of the permanent income approach, in which the government uses taxes
and transfers to achieve a constant level of total spending (private plus public) per capita over time. In the second, which they call the
“conditionally normative model,” the government does not touch the intergenerational distribution of private spending (consumption in their
vocabulary), but rather uses resource revenues to top-up the spending of early generations, because they are poorer in terms of private spending. resource tax rates if, as expected, the per capita
demand for public goods grows in step with per
capita GDP. Such increases in tax rates have a cost
in terms of greater economic distortion.
Economists argue that stabilizing tax rates over
time — a condition known as “tax smoothing” —
can minimize the distortionary cost of taxation.11
But stabilizing tax rates would require a constant
GR/GDP ratio, rather than constant or declining
GR per capita. 
Uncertainty complicates fiscal planning further.
The Permanent Resource Income Model
generates a prescription for a constant level of
resource expenditure, provided nothing changes.
In reality, however, most of the relevant factors,
including resource prices, extraction rates, costs
and reserve size have proven to be quite volatile
over time. Applied research uses a “certainty
equivalent” approach, in which expected values of
variables are treated as certain values in the
solution of the model, and no other adjustments
for uncertainty are made.12 This approach is
followed here. However, theoretical research
indicates that risk-averse agents respond to
uncertainty by saving more than the certainty
equivalent level, a phenomenon referred to as
“precautionary saving.” 
To summarize, we have identified three
arguments for deviating from our rule of constant
GR per capita. First, the equity argument: since
early generations will likely be poorer than future
generations, we should skew GR in the the
former’s favour. Second, following the theory of
tax smoothing, we should maintain a constant
GR/GDP ratio to keep tax rates constant and
minimize related distortions. In contrast to the
equity argument, this approach calls for skewing
GR in favour of future generations. Third,
precautionary savings requires more saving and
less spending than certainty equivalence, thus
skewing GR in favour of future generations
compared with our rule. 
Accounting formally for these three arguments
is beyond the scope of this Commentary.
However, we note that our model’s deviation on
the first item is opposite to its deviations on the
second and third items. Thus, the deviations may
be at least partially offsetting. Further, we note
that Alberta’s tax system is among the least
distorted in Canada, with flat tax rates of 10
percent on both personal and corporate income
and no provincial consumption tax.13 Thus, the
argument for tax smoothing may be weaker for
Alberta than elsewhere. Since equity and
efficiency are pulling policy in opposite directions
here, a rigorous approach would require finding
an optimal balance, which of course would lie
somewhere in the middle. It is possible that our
constant GR per capita rule may not be far off.
Finally, we note that, as a practical matter,
uncertainty of future variables means that regular
revisions of the fiscal plan will be necessary as
new information becomes available. At a given
planning date, the permanent income approach
yields a prescription for a constant level of
resource-based spending based on expected values
of variables and assuming nothing changes. But
of course conditions do change. In every planning
period (e.g. next fiscal year), the exercise will need
to be repeated, using realized values for the
elapsed period and updated forecasts of future
variables. In light of these changes, the prescribed
level of resource spending would change as well.
Thus, in retrospect the amount of per capita
resource spending would be variable, while in any
given year the plan would call for a constant value
moving forward. 
Historical Perspective:
Has Alberta Saved Enough? 
An essential part of the debate over resource
management in Alberta concerns whether past
governments have saved enough to provide for
future generations once resource stocks run out.
This question reflects a widely held belief, or at
least suspicion, that too much of the finite
resource wealth has been spent to date and not
| 4 Commentary 263
C.D. Howe Institute
11 Blanchard and Fischer (1989, 583-589) provide a discussion of the related literature. 
12 See Tersman (1991), Liuksila et al. (1994) and Davoodi (2002) for examples of this approach.
13 See Chen, Mintz and Tarasov (2007).enough saved.14 This concern has been fuelled by
numerous stories in the press (e.g. Scoffield 2006,
Saunders 2008) comparing Alberta’s approach
with that of Norway, which places a greater
emphasis on saving.15
This question appears to be backward looking,
as it concerns whether governments have made
appropriate decisions in the past. However, upon
examination, it is apparent that one cannot
answer this question without also taking into
account probable conditions in the future. One
needs a roadmap of where Albertans want to go
— or more precisely a statement of what future
citizens have a right to expect
— in order to assess whether
adequate provisions have been
made in the past. The
Permanent Resource Income
Model provides such a
roadmap. 
For this purpose, we suggest a “perfect
foresight” approach, in which past values are
taken as given and forecast values are assumed to
be certain. This approach amounts to a thought
experiment, in which spending and saving
decisions are retrospectively calculated from 1948
through to the end of extraction, following the
model.16 Of course, the government of Alberta
was not in this position in 1948, since it most
certainly could not foresee the paths of prices,
reserves, extraction and other variables.
Nonetheless, one can ask whether by accident the
government saved as much as prescribed by this
hypothetical scenario.  
As described previously, the task is to calculate
the annuity value from the government’s total
wealth, which consists of current financial assets
plus the present value of future resource revenues.
Estimating future resource revenues requires
forecasts of key variables, including resource
prices, reserves, extraction rates, royalties, interest
rates, inflation and population. We have based
our forecasts on the leading authorities in the
field, including the International Energy Agency
(IEA), the Energy Information Administration
(EIA) of the US Department of Energy, the
Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers
(CAPP) and others. We consider high, medium
and low forecasts associated with these variables.
The medium case is the most likely, and we refer
to it henceforth as the reference forecast.
(Appendices A and B describe
the data we use and the
mechanics of the PRIM.)
Based on the PRIM, we
estimate that, under the
reference forecast, a perfectly
foresighted planner would have
fixed GR at a constant value of $3,576 per capita,
starting in 1948, and would have carried a net
debt of approximately $74 billion at the
beginning of the 2007/08 fiscal year.17 In
contrast, the province managed a positive net
financial holding of $35.7 billion by that year.
Thus, we conclude that Alberta has saved more
than enough of its resource wealth to date,
compared with our benchmark. 
The high level of debt prescribed under
“perfect foresight” for 2007 results from the
unequal flow of resource revenues over time.
Figure 1 presents the paths of total resource
revenues, budget balances under perfect foresight
(PRIM) and actual budget balances for the
planning horizon 1948-2095.18 As shown, most
of Alberta’s resource revenues are expected to be
realized after 2005.19 Thus, our hypothetical
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14 For many expressions of this point of view, see the submissions to the Alberta Royalty Review Panel at www.albertaroyaltyreview.ca
15 We provide a detailed analysis of Norway’s approach later in the paper.
16 See Tersman (1991), Liuksila et al. (1994) and Davoodi (2002) for examples of this approach.
17 Except where noted, all monetary values are in 2007 dollars.
18 We are referring here to the consolidated budget of the province, including all saving funds. This version differs from the common notion
of the government’s budget, which corresponds with the General Revenue Fund. Note our numbers for the actual budget balance (as
opposed to PRIM) only cover the sub-period 1981-2007. 
19 As the figure presents nominal values, inflation accounts for some of this skew in the flow of revenues. Of course, inflation works to the
advantage of debtors as it erodes the value of debt principal. The brief decline and recovery of revenues during 2026-2031 reflects the
forecast exhaustion of conventional oil and natural gas in 2026, followed by the forecast peak in revenues from the oil sands in 2031.
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Figure 2:  Revenue and Savings (forecast vs. required)
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)1948 planner borrows against future earnings
until 1999 (with minor exceptions), in order to
finance spending in these early years. Then, from
2000 to 2013, the planner pays off debt. Finally,
the planner begins to accumulate net wealth in
2014.20 In contrast, the actual experience of the
province to date has involved more frequent
surpluses, as evidenced by the positive value of
net wealth in 2007 ($35.7 billion) and by the
actual budget balance series shown in the figure
(1981-2007 only). 
Looking Forward: a Sustainable
Policy for Resource Revenues 
The fact that Alberta has accumulated more
wealth to date than required under the “perfect
foresight” scenario allows it to sustain a more
generous level of GR per capita
moving forward. Starting in
2007/08, based on net
financial wealth of $35.7
billion, the model returns a
GR value of $4,501 per capita
in the reference case (roughly
$900 more per capita than for
the historical perspective).
This plan requires a
significant increase in the government’s savings
rate starting immediately, notwithstanding its
superior performance in the past. To illustrate,
Figure 2 compares resource revenues during the
five years from 2007-2011 (reference forecast)
with the budget surpluses required by the model
(“PRIM required savings”), and with the forecast
budget surpluses under current fiscal rules (“Fiscal
Responsibility Act — forecast savings”).
Figure 2 presents both total and direct resource
revenues. As explained in Appendix A, we classify
resource revenues as direct, indirect or diversified.
Direct revenue is equivalent to the line item
labelled “resource revenues” in the public
accounts, which includes royalty taxes, Crown
land leases, rentals and fees. Indirect revenue
corresponds with all other tax revenues generated
by oil, gas and related sectors in the province —
for example, corporate and personal income taxes.
Diversified revenue corresponds with taxes paid
by upstream and downstream firms that have
diversified away from reliance on the domestic oil
and gas sector. For example, firms that started by
servicing the oil and gas sector may eventually
find clients outside the province or in unrelated
domestic sectors. Although no longer generated
by domestic oil and gas activity, these revenues
are still classified as resource revenues since they
would not have come about without the impetus
provided by the resource sector. 
As shown in Figure 2, the required savings
under PRIM exceeds direct resource revenues by a
significant margin. In
particular, for the five years
2007-2011, the cumulative
surplus under PRIM amounts
to 53 percent of total resource
revenues and 139 percent of
direct revenues — i.e., more
than one-third greater than the
cumulative value of resource
royalties, land leases, rentals
and fees. Furthermore, these proportions are set
to increase progressively beyond the dates shown
in the figure.
The Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2007 (FRA)
establishes the province’s current policy toward
saving. Under the FRA, the first $5.3 billion of
direct resource revenues are to be allocated to
current spending, with the remainder saved.
Figure 2 shows the estimated size of the
remainder based on our reference forecast of
resource revenues.21 For the five years shown,
cumulative savings under FRA amount to only
36 percent of the level prescribed by PRIM
(alternatively, 48 percent of direct resource
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20 The series on net wealth is not shown in the figure.
21 As well, extra savings could come from unbudgeted surpluses. Thus, the values presented in Figure 2 represent a minimum expected level of
savings under the FRA. However, we note that the In-Year Surplus Allocation Policy requires two-thirds of unbudgeted surpluses to be
allocated to the Capital Account — in other words, on spending rather than saving. Also, the Sustainability Fund is currently not required
to retain all deposits legislated by the FRA and can direct funds towards capital projects. This reduces the expected level of savings under
the FRA.
This plan requires a




performance in the past.revenues). We conclude, therefore, that the
current savings commitment is insufficient to
maintain a constant level of GR per capita in the
future, under the reference forecast. This
conclusion is supported as well under high and
low forecasts of the variables as shown in
Appendix C.
We can also forecast the effect of the Fiscal
Responsibility Act over the long term (Figure 3,
reference forecast). Initially, the lower savings rate
under the FRA produces higher GR per capita
than the PRIM benchmark, but the spending
level declines steadily. By 2034, resource spending
under the FRA falls permanently below the
benchmark. By 2095, when the resource base is
exhausted, the spending level under the FRA is
only 25 percent of the PRIM benchmark. This
level is sustained thereafter by interest on
accumulated savings and by the flow of diversified
revenues (assumed constant after exhaustion).22
By 2068, direct resource revenues (not shown) fall
permanently below the $5.3 billion threshold,
and no further saving of resource revenues is
undertaken under the FRA. At this point, we
assume the government would adopt a minimalist
wealth preservation strategy by saving enough of
investment income every year to inflation-proof
the accumulated fund. The remainder of
investment income under this strategy is spent.
Figure 3 highlights the choice Albertans must
make between a sustainable policy of resource-
based spending and the current policy that
favours present over future generations. We
summarized earlier the debate among economists
over skewing resource expenditure in one
direction or another (the equity argument versus
tax smoothing and precautionary savings).
Following Engel and Valdes (2000), one could
justify the FRA policy on the basis of equity,
provided that non-resource GDP per capita grew
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22 In the absence of diversification, the long-run expenditure level would be lower under both PRIM and the FRA.in an offsetting fashion. However, as discussed,
tax smoothing and precautionary savings pull
policy in the opposite direction.
Moreover, while non-resource GDP may
indeed grow in the future, it is doubtful that it
will grow quickly enough to fully compensate for
the decline in G
R under the FRA. We forecast
that decline at an average annual rate of 1.88
percent (real) in the reference case. Given the
difference in size of the resource and non-resource
sectors, it is likely that non-resource GDP would
have to grow faster than 1.88 percent to fully
offset the lost resource revenues. For example, for
the 25-year period from 1981-2006, we estimate
that Alberta’s resource-based GDP was on average
35 percent larger than its non-resource GDP.23 It
follows that the annual growth rate of non-
resource GDP per capita would have to be 35
percent larger than this decline rate — i.e., 2.54
percent. Yet the average real growth rate of non-
resource GDP per capita in Alberta during this
period was only 1.2 percent per annum.24
Moreover, this rate is set to erode as the labour
force participation rate drops with the aging of
the population. Thus, there is ample reason to
doubt that non-resource growth could fully
compensate for the decline in GR entailed by the
FRA. 
Over the three years from 2007-2009, we forecast
the shortfall of planned savings under the Fiscal
Responsibility Act compared with the benchmark in
our reference model will average $8.8 billion per
year ($2007) — an amount equivalent to 26
percent of total expenditures planned for this period
in Budget 2007. Part of this gap could be covered
by unbudgeted surpluses, but part would
undoubtedly have to be made up by either
reductions in current expenditures, increases in
resource tax rates or increases in non-resource tax
levels.25
Resource tax rates include royalty rates (direct
resource revenues) as well as personal and
corporate taxes on income earned in the sector
(indirect resource revenues). While increasing
these rates would generate more revenue if
nothing else changed, in reality it would also
produce a number of offsetting effects. First,
higher resource taxes would boost the
government’s wealth by increasing the present
value of future resource revenues. As a result, the
prescribed level of GR per capita would increase
as well. This change would require either more or
less saving, depending where the government was
at in the borrowing/saving cycle of the model
(less saving early on, more saving later). Second,
increasing resource taxes would have a dampening
effect on activity in the sector, an effect that was
hotly debated during the recent royalty review in
the province. 
While accounting for these effects explicitly is
beyond the scope of the paper, we have
conducted sensitivity analysis on the effect of
higher royalty rates, holding everything else
constant.26  Our results indicate that while
increasing royalty rates (increasing prices) does
reduce the savings gap (111 percent of direct
revenues versus 139 percent), it does not come
close to eliminating it. Therefore, we expect that
the government would also have to pursue
reductions in expenditures as well as increases in
non-resource tax rates to close the savings gap. 
The prescribed policy provides a level of per
capita expenditure based on resource wealth that
could be sustained indefinitely if the forecast
proved to be true. The key to sustainability is the
gradual replacement of resource revenues with
income from accumulated savings. Figure 4
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23 We focus on private GDP; i.e., net of government expenditure. Mansell and Shlenker (2006) estimate resource activity accounts for
approximately 50 percent of Alberta GDP.. Therefore, multiplying GDP values (Statistics Canada, CANSIM V3839827) by 0.5 and
subtracting total government expenditure (Alberta budget documents) yields private non-resource GDP.
24 In neighbouring British Columbia, the growth rate for total GDP per capita during this period was even lower, at 0.9 percent per annum
(real). Statistics Canada, CANSIM V3839831.
25 Our reference forecast already makes provision for the announced increases in resource royalties in response to the Alberta Royalty Review
Panel. 
26 The results of the sensitivity analysis are presented in Table C1, Appendix C. We model an increase in resource royalty rates as equivalent to an
increase in resources prices holding royalty rates constant.illustrates this replacement process for the
reference forecast. Initially, investment income
amounts to only a few hundred dollars per capita,
while resource revenue amounts to more than
$7,000. By 2048, the two amounts are equal. By
the end of our horizon, investment income
accounts for approximately 86 percent of the total
value of GR per capita ($4,501). The remaining
14 percent ($633) consists of diversified resource
income, which we assume continues at a constant
level after the exhaustion of the resource base.27
The Bird-in-the-Hand Approach: 
Should Alberta Follow Norway’s
Example?
Much discussion in recent years has focused on
whether Alberta should follow Norway’s example
of saving a larger share of its resource wealth.28
Bjerkholt and Niculescu (2004) refer to this as
the Bird-in-the-Hand approach (BIH), because it
does not treat resource revenue as part of the
government’s wealth until the resource is
extracted and the revenue is realized. In this
approach, the government’s wealth consists solely
of current financial assets. Resource revenues are
to be saved in a fund, and only the income on the
fund is made available to the government for
spending in its annual budget.
Norway began managing its oil revenues in this
fashion in 1991. Since then it has accumulated
$368.2 billion in its saving fund, equivalent to
approximately $78,000 for every Norwegian
(Saunders 2008). Current legislation permits an
annual transfer of four percent of the equity for
spending in the government’s budget, equal to the
average expected rate of return of the fund
(Bjerkholt and Niculescu 2004). At present,
approximately 10 percent of the government’s
budget comes from this source (Saunders 2008). 
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Figure 4:  Sources of Resource-based Income





















27 Prior to exhaustion in 2095, the sum of resource revenues and investment income exceeds the value of GR per capita by the amount of savings
(total budget surplus). In our low variant of the forecast, diversified revenues are zero and investment income equals 100 percent of GR after
exhaustion. See Appendix C for the presentation of the various forecast scenarios. 
28 See for example Saunders (2008), Scoffield (2006) and ARRP (2007).Alberta also has a vehicle for saving resource
wealth, the Alberta Heritage Savings Trust Fund
— commonly referred to as The Heritage Fund.
Established in 1976, it grew to $12.7 billion by
1987, but no further deposits were made until
2005. It now stands at $16.6 billion, or
approximately $4,900 per Albertan (AHST 2007,
2008 and Statistics Canada).  In contrast, since
1976, the province has received a total of $148.1
billion in direct oil and gas revenues and an
estimated $330.7 billion in total revenues (direct
+ indirect + diversified). During the same period
(1976-2007), direct oil and gas revenues (net of
deposits into the Heritage Fund) accounted for
29 percent of current government spending,
while total revenues (net of deposits into the
Heritage Fund) accounted for an estimated 69
percent of current spending. Finally, investment
income received from the Heritage Fund
accounted for an additional six percent of
spending (Boothe 1995, Alberta budget
documents and authors’ estimation).
Arguments that have been put forward in
support of the Bird-in-the-Hand approach
include inter-generational equity, precautionary
savings and maintaining competitiveness in
manufacturing and other non-resource sectors
(avoidance of the so-called “Dutch disease”).29
The equity argument in this case differs from the
one discussed earlier (i.e. skewing GR in favour of
present generations to compensate for lower non-
resource GDP). In this case, equity reflects the
perception that current spending of resource
revenue is wasteful by definition, while saving is
far-sighted and disciplined. Precautionary saving,
as above, responds to the possibility of negative
shocks, such as a sudden downturn in resource
prices or an adverse shock to the non-oil
economy. Similarly, the prospect of increasing
government obligations for health care spending
in an aging society would seem to recommend
saving more for the future. 
The Dutch disease phenomenon consists of
two effects, one operating through the currency
and the other through aggregate demand. The
first effect involves the appreciation of the local
currency, due to the impact of export revenues.
The higher exchange rate makes imported goods
cheaper than those manufactured at home, thus
undermining the competitiveness of the domestic
manufacturing sector. The second effect involves
the potentially inflationary impact of high
government spending when it is financed by
resource revenues rather than taxation. If inflation
feeds through to wage levels, competitiveness is
again undermined. The BIH approach limits
these effects, provided the equity of the savings
fund is held in foreign assets, as is the case with
Norway. This practice limits the pressure on the
domestic currency by limiting the annual inflow
of revenue. In the same way, the inflationary
impact of government spending is restrained. 
We believe that most of these arguments either
go too far in favouring future generations or do
not apply fully to Alberta. Barnett and Ossowski
(2002) describe the Bird-in-the-Hand approach
as “an extreme form of precautionary savings, in
that it is tantamount to assuming that there
would be no future oil revenues” (p. 9). Such an
outcome would occur, for example, if there were
a sudden, permanent collapse in the price of oil.
But since the likelihood of such an outcome is
extremely small, the BIH approach is excessively
cautious. Further, as we will show below, the BIH
approach in its pure form entails an extreme bias
in the allocation of resource benefits in favour of
future generations.30
In terms of Dutch disease, we note that, as one
province in a large federation, Alberta’s influence
on the Canadian dollar is more limited than it
would be if, as Norway, it were a national
economy with its own currency. Further, labour
mobility within the federation helps moderate
wage pressures, compared with what they would
be otherwise. Historically, there has been scant
evidence of an adverse impact on non-resource
sectors in Alberta. Indeed, one could argue that a
diversified economy did not substantially exist in
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29 See Saunders (2008), Scoffield (2006) and Bjerkholt and Niculescu (2004).
30 York (2008) provides a telling illustration of the future bias of BIH in the context of East Timor.Alberta prior to the discovery of oil and gas, and
it is the exploitation of these resources that has
stimulated the development of manufacturing in
upstream and downstream industries. More
recently, manpower shortages and wage pressures
have started to resemble the symptoms of Dutch
disease. Yet these results are clearly due to the
investment boom in the oil sands rather than the
government’s fiscal policy. 
Therefore, we conclude that the Bird-in-the-
Hand approach does not provide a compelling
framework for guiding fiscal policy. Nonetheless,
some of the arguments above have validity in
terms of savings funds in general. To the extent
that the recent surge in the Canadian dollar may
be partially due to increased exports of oil and
natural gas, holding the equity of the fund
“offshore” — i.e., in foreign assets — could
provide some benefit by reducing upward
pressure on the dollar.31 Similarly, any savings
plan would by definition restrain government
spending, thereby moderating potential
inflationary pressures.
In any case, using 2007 as a starting point, the
Permanent Resource Income Model actually calls
for more saving than BIH in all but the most
optimistic scenarios, if one follows the Norwegian
approach of saving only direct resource
revenues.32 In other words, using realistic
assumptions, Alberta should not follow Norway’s
example, but in fact it should save more.
To illustrate, we consider both pure and
practical applications of Bird-in-the-Hand under
the reference forecast (Figure 5). The pure
application would save both direct and indirect
resource revenues,33 while the practical
(Norwegian style) application focuses only on
direct revenues. We apply a transfer rate of 3.5
percent to the fund equity – this amount of
investment income is transferred each year to the
government’s budget for spending. This rate is
equal to our reference forecast for the real return
on investment. 
The extreme future bias of the pure BIH
approach is evident. As argued above, we do not
find such a bias to be ethically compelling.
Moreover, the savings commitment for this
version of BIH is extreme. As was shown in
Figure 2, the sum of direct and estimated indirect
revenues is only slightly less than total resource
revenue. During the three years 2007-2009, this
sum amounts to approximately 77 percent of the
forecast for total government spending provided
in Budget 2007 and 2.5 times the value of direct
resource revenues. In political terms, this savings
plan would probably be impossible, even if it
were desirable.
In contrast, the practical version of BIH (saving
only direct revenues) projects a gradual downward
trend in GR per capita. While this trend is not so
pronounced as under the Fiscal Responsibility Act
and therefore perhaps more acceptable (compare
Figure 3), we note a tendency for fluctuations in
the first 25 years of the plan that cannot be
justified in terms of any meaningful economic or
social objectives. This outcome results from the
arbitrary decision to limit savings to a particular
category of revenue rather than focusing on a
compelling long-term goal, such as sustaining GR
per capita. For this reason, as argued above, we
favour the constant spending policy model
(PRIM). As already discussed, this policy requires
savings in excess of direct resource revenues — 39
percent more during the five years 2007 to 2011
under the reference forecast. In return, it results
in a long-run value of GR per capita that is
approximately 29 percent higher than the
practical (Norwegian) version of BIH ($4,501
versus $3,502 after 2095). 
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31 See Laidler (2008) for a discussion of the link between the Canadian dollar and resource prices. According to AHST (2008), just over 30
percent of the equity of the Heritage Fund was held in foreign-denominated investments, as of December 31, 2007. 
32 See Appendix C for the sensitivity analysis.
33 It would not save diversified revenues, since these revenues are sustained after exhaustion of the resource. Unlike PRIM, which focuses on
smoothing the benefits from all sources, BIH only saves revenues from exhaustible sources.Reforming the Budgeting Process
Budget Planning
Our discussion leads to the following
recommendations for changes to Alberta’s
budgeting process. 
￿ Target a constant per-capita level of spending
out of resource wealth.34
Our estimate of GR per capita in the reference
case is $4,501. The sensitivity analysis
(Appendix C) shows how this value varies with
assumptions about the forecast.
￿ Pursue an aggressive program of savings, based
on the model’s estimates.
In our reference case, required saving in the
near-term (2007-2011) is equal to 139 percent
of direct resource revenues. The sensitivity
analysis (Appendix C) shows how this
requirement varies with assumptions about the
forecast. In the most plausible scenarios, the
savings requirement is uniformly greater than
direct revenues. In comparison, the current rule
under the Fiscal Responsibility Act results in a
savings rate (near-term) of less than 50 percent
of direct resource revenues in the reference
case. Clearly, the government has significant
work to do in closing the gap between our
recommended target and the existing policy.
Achieving the target will require a combination
of reductions in annual spending and increases
in non-resource tax levels.
￿ Revise the plan regularly.
As discussed, the estimate of a constant value
of GR per capita depends upon forecast values
of future variables. As information changes,
the forecast changes and, therefore, the
estimated value of GR must change as well. It
follows that the goal of a constant value of GR
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34 In technical terms, this is known as the Non-resource Primary Deficit. See Appendix B and Busby (2008) for a discussion.will only be realized in the hypothetical sense,
within the context of a given year’s plan. In
reality, the attained value of GR will vary from
year to year as information — and thus the
plan — changes as well. 
Reporting and Data
Implementing this approach to budget planning
calls for the following changes in the way the
Alberta government reports its results and in the
data available to budget planners and the general
public. 
￿ Consolidate the government’s savings funds. 
A coherent approach to long-term fiscal
planning requires a comprehensive view of the
government’s budget. The current practice of
presenting “the budget” in terms of a single
account (the General Revenue Fund) distinct
from other funds and accounts (e.g., the
Heritage Fund, the Sustainability Fund, the
Capital Account, and the Alberta Heritage
Medical Research and Endowment Fund)
diverts attention from the big picture and
makes a long-term focus difficult. The
Permanent Resource Income Model assumes
one comprehensive savings fund for financial
assets and one current budget account. 
￿ Publish estimates of indirect resource revenues
in addition to direct revenues in the public
accounts and budget documents.
Currently, the government’s financial reporting
distinguishes only direct resource revenues
from other forms of taxation. This
presentation significantly underestimates the
true level of revenues from natural resources
and thus distorts the public’s perception of the
sources of government wealth. An informed
public debate about the allocation of resource
wealth over time requires full information
about the amounts involved. 
￿ Improve estimation techniques for indirect
and diversified resource revenues.
Unlike direct revenues, which can be easily
identified through the accounting trail,
estimating indirect revenues requires an
economic modelling exercise in order to isolate
the components of corporate and personal
income taxes (and other taxes) that come from
resource-based activities. Further research
effort is needed to improve the available
modelling capacity. This requirement is even
more acute in relation to diversified revenues.
Our current ability to estimate this category
amounts to little more than educated guessing
and yet, as demonstrated, these revenues play a
key role in planning a coherent fiscal policy.
￿ Display long-term consequences. 
Budget debates typically focus on next year’s
total balance — i.e., whether the budget is
forecast to be in surplus or deficit. In addition,
the government produces a three-year plan
with the budget.  Yet, because non-renewable
natural resources will run out, the
consequences of spending resource revenues
are permanent. Therefore, budget planners
should present the expected consequences of
current spending decisions in the short,
medium and long-term. For example, our
analysis of the Fiscal Responsibility Act above
(Figure 3) shows in a simple and clear way that
high spending today will permanently lower
spending in the future, under the assumptions
of the forecast. This type of information is
essential for an informed public debate. 
Conclusion
In this Commentary, we have sought to answer (i)
whether the government of Alberta has saved
enough of its resource wealth to date, (ii) what
policy is sustainable, moving forward, (iii) what
are the implications of this policy for current
budget planning, and (iv) whether the province
should follow Norway’s example of saving all of
its direct resource revenues. We concluded that
although the government has saved more then
enough to date, it now needs to embark on an
aggressive savings program (139 percent of direct
resource revenues during the five years 2007-2011
under the reference forecast) in order to sustain a
constant level of per capita spending out of
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must save more than the Norwegian standard,
not less. 
This result may seem somewhat paradoxical.
On the one hand, the savings rate has been more
than sufficient to date. On the other hand, the
current requirement under the Fiscal Responsibility
Act — which even on its own will take resource
savings to new highs — nonetheless falls seriously
short of what is needed to meet the sustainability
benchmark in the future.
The explanation for this apparent contradiction
lies in the very large scale of borrowing and saving
entailed in the Permanent Resource Income Model.
Unlike the Norwegian approach, the PRIM
manages all three categories of resource revenues
over time — direct, indirect and diversified. Given
the large sums involved, the model generates very
large targets, both for borrowing, when
appropriate, and for saving. Our analysis of the
historical question (starting in 1948) shows that
Alberta has only recently passed the prescribed
transition date from borrowing to saving (1999).
The sudden swing from more than enough saving
to grossly inadequate saving is consistent with 
the model. 
We have followed a rather conventional,
optimistic view of prospects for the oil and gas
sector — one that foresees only moderate
downside risks in terms of prices and revenues. In
contrast, the possibility exists for major negative
shocks. For example, the development of
alternative technologies or stringent
environmental standards could render the
resource obsolete even before exhaustion.
Alternatively, environmental degradation or
resource scarcity may make future generations
worse off than present. All these possibilities
point to a heightened precautionary motive for
savings.35 Thus an argument can be made that
our savings target — as aggressive as it is —
perhaps should be viewed as a minimum
threshold for current policy. 
Planning for a sustainable fiscal policy is
complicated by large uncertainties and
approximation errors related to future oil and gas
prices, recoverable reserves, indirect revenues, and
diversification, among other things. Combined
with the more garden-variety fluctuations in the
economic environment, these factors suggest that
the estimate of permanent income that underlies
the model will constantly change. While this
volatility is less than ideal, it is certainly not
unusual in public affairs. For example, Canadians
are accustomed to variability in the conduct of
monetary policy, and we have developed
significant institutional capacity and mechanisms
to manage uncertainties in this context.
Therefore, there is every reason to believe that
stakeholders would be able to adapt to variability
in the conduct of a sustainable fiscal policy.
Provided the government updates its estimate of
permanent income in a timely and transparent
manner, the adoption of this approach should
bring greater coherence and discipline to the
formulation of fiscal policy than has been
experienced to date.
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36 The government's fiscal year runs April 1 - March 31, whereas our analysis employs calendar years. For simplicity, we attribute data to the first
year of the split fiscal year, e.g., 2006 in the case of fiscal 2006/07. 
37 One could quibble whether royalty taxes are levied on the resource or the company, since royalty formulas typically take into account much
firm-related detail, including revenues and costs. However, in theory, the royalty represents a payment to the owner for the sale of the resource.
Therefore, we classify it as a direct charge on the resource.




Our historical analysis begins in 1948, which marked the beginning of major oil exploitation in Alberta
and continues until fiscal 2006/07 inclusive.36
Direct resource revenues
We define direct revenues as those which are levied on the resource rather than the company. This
category includes royalty taxes and Crown land leases. For practical purposes, we take it as equivalent to
the Alberta Public Accounts line item labelled “resource revenues.”37 We have assembled this data from
Boothe (1995) for the period 1948 to 1980 and from Alberta budget documents from 1981 to 2007.
Due to the quasi-consolidation techniques applied by Boothe (1991, 1995), the values from 1976 to
1980 had to be increased to account for transfers to the Heritage Fund. 
Indirect resource revenues
We define indirect resource revenues as all other tax revenues generated by the oil and gas sector in the
province. This category includes: corporate income taxes paid by oil and gas firms as well as upstream
and downstream firms (businesses that either service the sector or process its outputs); personal income
taxes paid by employees of such firms; and other taxes and fees paid by households that derive their
income from such firms. Indirect resource revenues are not distinguished by particular line items in the
public accounts and, therefore, it is necessary to employ some method for estimating them from
available data. The challenge is to extract the portion of revenues in these line items (e.g. corporate
income tax, personal income tax) that can be attributed to oil and gas activities in the province. 
An ideal approach would involve using a dynamic simulation model of the Alberta economy to
counterfactually identify indirect resource revenues. Unfortunately, to the best of our knowledge, such a
model does not exist. Mansell and Shlenker (2006) employ Statistics Canada’s Interprovincial Input-
Output Model to estimate the total impact of oil and gas extraction on Alberta’s economy during the
period 1971 to 2004, and we use their results as the basis for a simple multiplier showing the
relationship between indirect resource revenues and activity in the oil and gas sector. The Interprovincial
Input-Output Model is static in nature, which means that it is calibrated for a particular year — 2001
in the version used by Mansell and Shlenker.38 Given the length of our time frame — 149 years from
1948 to 2095 — we opted against using the model directly.
We define the indirect revenue multiplier (IRM) as the ratio of the total value of indirect resource
revenues in an average year to the total value of production of oil and gas (sales revenue) in the year.Commentary 263 | 17
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During the same period, the cumulative value of direct resource revenue was approximately $126
billion. The $151 billion difference is the cumulative value of indirect resource revenues during this
period. 
CAPP (2007a) provides data on aggregate sales revenue per year for oil and gas in Alberta. The
cumulative value of sales revenue for 1971-2004 was $710 billion. Thus, the baseline estimate of our
multiplier is 0.213 (equal to 151/710). We then apply this multiplier to the sales revenue in every year
to obtain an expected value of indirect resource revenue that year. 
We are aware that this calculation may be subject to distortion, arising from (i) changes in the tax
code over time and (ii) changes in the relative importance of conventional oil, natural gas and oil sands
in the product mix. For this and other reasons, we conduct sensitivity analysis in Appendix  to
investigate the effects of changes in the value of the multiplier. In addition to the baseline estimate of
IRM of 0.213, which we label medium, we also test high and low values of 0.25 and 0.15 respectively.
These values are summarized in Table 1. 
Alberta Finance (2007) claims that the use of the
input-output model overestimates the relative size of
the oil and gas sector in provincial GDP. We
conclude, therefore, that the weight of uncertainty
on the IRM is likely on the low side. 
Non-resource primary deficit
This measure is defined as the difference between
non-resource primary revenues (i.e. non-resource
total revenues minus investment income) and current program expenditures. The necessary data on
revenue and expenditure are obtained from the same sources as direct resource revenues. 
Net financial wealth
This measure is defined as the difference between the total of all the government’s financial assets,
including the equity in savings funds, and its financial liabilities. At present, our series is only partial:
we have an initial data point for 1948, obtained from the Public Accounts (Alberta 1948) and a
subsequent series, 1981 to 2007, obtained from Alberta budget documents. 
Rate of return
We have calculated annual rates of return for the Heritage Fund using data on income and equity
obtained from AHSTF (2007) and AHSTF (2008). We consider these rates indicative of the
opportunities available to Alberta government planners during the period of operation of the fund
(1977 to 2007). We use these rates as the basis for calculating present values during this period. 
For the earlier period (1948 to 1976), we consider returns on a hypothetical portfolio consisting of a
mix of bonds and equities. For 1948 to 1956, we assume an equal mix of government and industrial
bonds. For 1957 to 1976, we assume one-third government bonds, one-third industrial bonds and one-
third equities. For government bonds, we use average yields on 10-year maturities. For industrial bonds,
we use annual average yields reported by McLeod, Young and Weir. For equities, we use the benchmark
index of the Toronto Stock Exchange. The data are obtained from Statistics Canada, Historical Statistics






IRM: indirect revenue multiplier 
DR: diversification rate| 18 Commentary 263
C.D. Howe Institute
Table 2 summarizes the rate of return data. A
maximum nominal value of 15.7 percent is obtained
in 1980, with a minimum value of -8.4 percent in
1948. The decadal averages are indicated as well. 
Inflation
Our measure of the inflation rate for 1948 to 1978
is the national consumer “all-items” price index,
obtained from Statistics Canada, CANSIM series
v41693271. For 1979 to 2007, we use the provincial
consumer “all-items” price index, CANSIM series
v41694625. While the implicit GDP price deflator
would seem to be a more comprehensive measure of
inflation, we could not find consistent data on this statistic prior to 1961. 
Population
We have obtained annual population data from Statistics Canada, CANSIM series V15.
A.2. Forecast data
Horizon
Our forecast period begins in 2007 and terminates with the anticipated exhaustion of the resource stock
in 2095 (see below for details). 
Resource prices
EIA (2008) and IEA (2007) long-term price forecasts of oil are averaged into one price path for our
reference case. The EIA forecasts of oil prices are based on a weighted average price of imported low-
sulphur oil delivered to US refiners, whereas the IEA forecasts are based on the price of crude oil
imports. Natural gas prices are taken from EIA (2008) and are based on average wellhead prices for the
US (lower 48 states). Prices are converted into $C at a fixed rate of 0.90 US/C. According to this
forecast, the price of conventional oil falls from $91.65 per barrel in 2008 to $65.35 in 2016 and then
rises gradually to $75.55 in 2030, where it remains subsequently (all figures $C 2007). 
For oil sands, most of Alberta’s royalty taxes after 2007 will be based on the price of bitumen, a
lower-grade commodity than the benchmark light, sweet grades. For the years 2006 to 2010, Alberta
(2007) uses an average price conversion factor between bitumen and the light, sweet benchmark (WTI)
of approximately 0.45. Applying this factor to the price for conventional oil yields our forecast of the
price of bitumen. The trend of the bitumen price follows that of conventional oil, adjusted by the
conversion factor. 
The forecast of the natural gas price envisages a fall from $7.02 per thousand cubic feet in 2008 to
$5.91 in 2016. It then rises gradually to $7.37 in 2030 ($C 2007). The EIA attributes the softening in
price during the first decade to increased supply of liquefied natural gas and demand destruction due to
the relatively high near-term prices.
Table 2: Rates of Return (nominal %)
max value: 1980 15.7
min value: 1948 -8.4








Source: Authors’ calculations; Statistics Canada, Historical
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39 Authors’ calculation for the period 2000-2006, based on data from CAPP (2007a).
Sensitivity analysis on resource prices is based on the deviation between the reference and low-price
forecasts from EIA (2007). The gradual separation of the forecasts, starting from a common value in
2007, results in a 40 percent deviation between the two in 2030. We apply the same deviation pattern
to our reference price data (discussed above) to obtain both our low- and high (inverse deviation
pattern) price forecasts. 
Reserves
Our forecast assumes recoverable reserves in the oil sands of 78 billion barrels as of 2007, which is an
average of the values reported in BP (2007) and World Oil Journal (2006). Based on data from CAPP
(2007a), we estimate remaining reserves of conventional oil and natural gas of 1.623 billion barrels and
40,300 billion cubic feet respectively. Due to uncertainty, estimates of reserves from coal-bed methane
have not been included in our forecast. 
Recent experience indicates an average replacement rate of reserves of conventional oil and natural
gas from new drilling equal to 60 percent of annual production.39 But these rates are likely to diminish
(Scott 2007). To accommodate this possibility, our forecast begins with a 60 percent replacement rate in
2007 for both conventional oil and natural gas, with conventional oil falling to zero in 2013 and with
natural gas falling to 30 percent in 2018 and zero thereafter.
Production
For the oil sands, our forecast follows CAPP (2007b) initially, rising to 1,387 million barrels per year
(3.8 million per day) in 2020. We conjecture that the trend continues rising, reaching 1,643 million
barrels per year (4.5 million per day) in 2027, where it remains until starting to fall in 2032. We
assume a decline rate of three percent per annum for the remainder of the period, which is similar to
assumptions made in Segura (2006) and Davoodi (2002) regarding conventional oil. This production
profile leads to exhaustion of reserves in 2095. 
For conventional oil, we assume a constant rate of decline of production of 9 percent per year, based
on data from Alberta (2007) and CAPP (2007a). This value is slightly higher than the actual decline
rate over the last 10 years in CAPP (2007a), signifying an ongoing decrease in production as reserves
dwindle. The forecast starts at 183 million barrels per year in 2007 and falls thereafter, taking into
account the decline rate and the partial replacement of reserves discussed above. Production falls to zero
with the exhaustion of reserves in 2026. The same decline rate is used for natural gas. Therefore,
following a similar approach, we forecast gas production falling from 5.2 trillion cubic feet in 2007 to
exhaustion in 2026. 
Sector revenues
The preceding forecasts of prices and production allow us to predict the total sales value of oil and gas
production in Alberta during the next century, which we then use as the basis for our forecast of direct
and indirect resource revenues for the government. | 20 Commentary 263
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Direct resource revenues
We base our prediction of direct resource revenues (royalties, leases, rentals and fees) on the sector
revenues, using historical absorption rates. In reality, there is an endogenous relationship between
royalty rates and sector revenues, as firms’ production decisions depend in part on royalty rates.
However, a rigorous modelling of these feedbacks is beyond the scope of the paper. Instead we employ
sensitivity analysis in Appendix C to test different scenarios.
Royalty rates are set at historical levels for the first two years of our forecast period and then shift
upwards in 2009 with the implementation of the new royalty regime announced this year following the
report of the Alberta Royalty Review Panel. These shifts were stress tested against the forecasts outlined
on p.17 in ARRP (2007). 
For natural gas, we assume royalty taxes initially accrue at a rate of 14 percent of production value,
shift to 16 percent in 2009, fall to 15 percent in 2012 and finally to 14 percent in 2016, remaining at
this level until exhaustion. For conventional oil, we assume royalty taxes initially accrue at 6 percent of
production value, shift to 10 percent in 2009, fall to 9 percent in 2016, and then remain at this level
thereafter. For oil sands, we assume royalty taxes initially accrue at a rate of 6 percent of production
value, shift to 8 percent in 2009, rise to 9 percent in 2026, then gradually drop to 8 percent in 2042, 7
percent in 2055 and 6 percent in 2069 where it remains for the last years before exhaustion in 2095.
Reductions in absorption rates over time are due to “low productivity offsets” as the quality of
remaining reserves declines. 
Based on Alberta budget documents, we note that lease sales amounted on average to 15 percent of
royalty taxes from oil and gas during the period 2004-2007. We assume this rate to continue in our
forecast. Finally, rentals and fees yielded the government $150 million annually during the period 2000-
2006, an amount we assume will continue in our forecast. 
Indirect resource revenues
We estimate indirect resource revenues by the application of two multipliers to the forecast sales 
values. The first is the indirect revenue multiplier (IRM) defined in the historical data. The second,
which we call the diversification rate (DR), is intended to capture the shift, in upstream and
downstream industries, from servicing and processing domestic oil and gas, to exporting goods and
services out-of-province or servicing other unrelated domestic sectors. If these upstream and
downstream firms do not achieve any diversification – if they remain completely dependent on the
domestic oil and gas industry – then they will dwindle and die as the resource base diminishes and is
exhausted. In that event, the government’s indirect resource revenues will also diminish to zero along
with the resource base. In contrast, if upstream and downstream firms succeed at diversifying from
domestic oil and gas, then the government’s revenues from these industries will be sustained. 
Our view of economic development is that the pressure for diversification becomes particularly acute
when the original base for upstream and downstream firms starts to diminish. In this vein, we note that
the maximum value of indirect revenues in our reference forecast – and thus the maximum value of oil
and gas production — occurred in 2005. Therefore, we use 2005 as the benchmark for defining values
of the diversification rate in subsequent years. For example, if indirect resource revenues in 2010 are $5
billion lower than in 2005 and DR = 0.15, then 15 percent of this loss, or $750 million, will be
recouped by diversification from domestic oil and gas. In this case, the net loss to the government’sCommentary 263 | 21
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coffers will be $4.25 billion.40 By assumption, the value of DR prior to 2005 is always zero. In this way,
the diversification rate directly addresses the question of how much of indirect revenues can be
maintained as oil and gas resources diminish.
Unfortunately, we are not aware of any empirical research that can be used to ground our value of
DR. Therefore, we use plausible conjectures. We believe it is prudent to err on the low side with this
value. First of all, diversification can only occur in upstream or downstream industries, not the primary
oil and gas sector itself. While we do not know the relative contributions of the sectors to indirect
revenues, we suggest that 50 percent is a reasonable hypothesis on the upper bound of the contribution
of the upstream and downstream sectors, leaving the remaining 50 percent for the oil and gas industry
itself. Thus complete diversification is represented by a value of DR = 0.5. 
Second, we believe that complete diversification is unlikely to occur as domestic oil and gas
production diminishes. Complete diversification would imply immediate replacement of lost business
with either export sales or new domestic customers. In contrast, anecdotal evidence suggests that
diversification is a much slower process, usually following upon a period of crisis and contraction. 
Furthermore, some upstream and downstream industries simply may not be diversifiable. In this vein,
ARRP (2007, 33) observes that the petrochemical industry “once had access to inexpensive natural gas
as feedstock, but as pipeline capacity expanded, the gas was available for export and its price became set
by market forces. Low natural gas prices had been this industry’s main advantage, but that advantage
has disappeared in recent years as North American natural gas prices have strengthened.” Mansell and
Shlenker (2006, 22) note that the petrochemical industry accounted for “over 20 percent of
manufacturing value added in Alberta” in 2003 and further that “it would be hard to argue that the
petrochemical industry would exist in Alberta in the absence of the oil and gas industry.” 
Finally, companies that are diversifying from the Alberta resource market are also likely to relocate
some portion of activity to their new markets, with the result that some portion of tax revenues would
be lost to other jurisdictions. For example, head office jobs may remain in Alberta while field activities,
manufacturing or processing may relocate. 
Ultimately, it seems implausible that an economy would experience the decline of a major extractive
industry without experiencing some degree of contraction. Accordingly, we suggest 0.25 as a maximum
plausible value for DR, and we test lower values of 0.15 and 0 as well, the latter representing the
extreme (and also implausible) case of no diversification at all. In the text, we refer to these values as
high, medium and low respectively. They are summarized in Table 2.
Inflation
The inflation rate is forecast to be constant at 2.0 percent, which is the central value of the Bank of
Canada’s present target range.
Rate of return
The real return on investment is forecast to be constant at a rate of 3.5 percent per annum, compared
with an average actual rate of 3.4 percent over the period 1948-2007 and 4.8 percent over the more
recent period 1990-2007. This real rate is equivalent to a nominal value of 5.57 per cent per annum,
given the expected inflation rate. Sensitivity analysis is performed in Appendix C at low and high rates
of 3.0 and 4.0 percent respectively.
40 We apply DR to differences in the real value of indirect revenues from the 2005 benchmark, rather than nominal differences.| 22 Commentary 263
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Population projections
Following C.D. Howe Institute projections, Alberta’s population is forecast to grow at a rate of 1.77
percent in 2008, compared with an average actual growth rate of 1.93 percent during the period 2000-
2007. The growth rate is forecast to fall gradually in subsequent periods, reaching zero in 2058, yielding
a steady-state population of 4.54 million. For sensitivity analysis in Appendix C, a high population
scenario forecasts population growth to continue until 2069, yielding a steady-state value of 4.66
million. Meanwhile, a low-population scenario forecasts growth continuing until 2038, for a steady-
state value of 3.91 million.Commentary 263 | 23
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Most theoretical treatments of the permanent income model deal with constant rates of interest,
inflation and population growth. In contrast, given the large historical component of our data set, we
have variable rates for over approximately 40 percent of the planning horizon. 
A particular challenge concerns how to handle negative real interest rates, which occurred 13 times in
our 59-year historical sample (1948-2006). Negative real interest rates have the effect of inflating
present values, and they raise important conceptual issues regarding our assumption of complete
knowledge or foresight. In particular, is it reasonable to assume that a planner with complete knowledge
would hold financial assets during a period of negative real interest rates? Upon reflection, it seems clear
that such a planner would switch into commodities during such periods — for example, oil — since
their values would be growing faster than financial assets. Therefore, we set the planner’s discount rate
during the historical period as the maximum of the real interest rate and 0 (equivalently the maximum
of the nominal interest rate and the inflation rate). 
Further, we note that the duality between constant expenditure and constant wealth is broken when
rates of return vary over a subset of the planning period.41 Therefore, with variable returns, the
modeller must choose between holding constant either expenditure or wealth. We choose the former,
since we view wealth as the means to an end — expenditure — and not an end in itself. In this
approach, fluctuations in wealth can act as a shock absorber to help smooth expenditure during periods
of volatility in returns. When we move into our forecast period (2007-2095), rates of return are
assumed constant (expected value) and the link between constant expenditure and constant wealth is
restored. Thus, in the long run, the interpretation of permanent income as the return on total wealth is
valid.
Davoodi (2002) provides a useful presentation of the model with variable rates. However, his
formulas are based on smoothing wealth rather than expenditure. In contrast, we present a version of
the model for smoothing expenditure. Let it, rt, πt and nt represent the nominal interest rate, real
interest rate, inflation rate and population growth rate respectively, in period t. Let T denote the last
period of extraction (2095 in our forecast); i.e., the resource is exhausted in all periods t>T. During the
historical period (1948-2006), it, rt, πt and nt are variable, while during the forecast period (they are
constant and satisfy the relationship (1 + i) > (1 + n) (1 + π)  (B1)
or equivalently r > n.42 Assumption (B1) requires that the nominal rate of return is large enough to
cover more than the increase in population and the price level — a necessary condition for maintaining
a constant real per capita level of expenditure out of savings in steady state (i.e. after T).
Let Rt denote the government’s resource revenues at t, G
R
t its expenditure out of resource wealth and
At its stock of financial assets. It is important to note that G
R
t is not the only source of spending, as the
government also has non-resource tax revenues, which we denote NRt. However, if our concepts are to
be meaningful, then the government can only have one source of borrowing — borrowing to finance
G
R
t when it exceeds Rt — and one source of saving — the surplus of Rt when it exceeds G
R
t . These
values would not equal net borrowing or net saving if the government offset them in some other
account — for example, if the government ran a surplus in a resource account while running a deficit in
a general budget account. For this reason, the budgeting process must take a unified view of all
government accounts and funds. It follows that, since all saving is resource saving, all financial assets or
debts are resource-based as well.
Appendix B: Mechanics of the Permanent Resource Income Model
41 This result is proven formally in Shiell and Busby (2008). 
42 The absence of a time subscript indicates a constant value.| 24 Commentary 263
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Due to the integration of accounts, the sustainability rule imposes discipline on all components of
the budget. In particular, discipline takes the form of a requirement that total government expenditure
is covered by the sum of G
R
t and NRt; there is no other source of borrowing or revenue on a separate is
covered by the sum of G
R
t and NRt; there is no other source of borrowing or revenue on a separate
account. Denoting total government expenditure as Gt, we have Gt = G
R
t + NRt .
Rearranging yields Gt - NRt = G
R
t , (B2)
where the left side is referred to as the non-resource primary deficit (NRPD). This measures the
amount by which non-resource tax revenues fall short of covering total government expenditure, and
the shortfall is made up by G
R
t. 
The literature on fiscal sustainability identifies the NRPD as the target of policy. Permanent income
determines G
R
t , which in turn is equal to the allowable annual NRPD. Since G
R
t is constant (in per
capita terms in our version), NRPD must also be constant (in per capita terms). The government can
meet this target by adjusting total expenditure or non-resource taxation levels. Thus, the setting of Gt,
NRt and G
R
t are integrated in the budgeting process, consistent with a sustainability rule based on equal
sharing of resource wealth. 
The government’s budget constraint is At+1 = (At + Rt + NRt - Gt)(1 + it + 1) which upon
substituting from (B2) becomes 
At + 1 = (At + Rt - G
R
t)(1 + it + 1) (B3)
This equation can be rewritten to show the contribution of the budget’s primary and total balances. In
particular, 
At + 1 - At = (Rt - G
R
t) + it + 1(At + Rt - G
R
t) (B3')
The first term on the right of  is the primary balance, the second term is net investment income, and
the sum is the total balance. The primary balance provides a measure of saving out of resource revenues,
while the total balance provides a measure of net saving, taking account of net investment income
(income on financial assets less interest payments on debt). It is the latter measure, total balance, that
provides the change in the government’s financial position for the year and the most common measure
of the government’s surplus or deficit.
To demonstrate our solution of the model, it will be useful to consider (B3) in real, per capita terms.
For this purpose, let Nt and Pt denote population and price level at t, respectively. 
By definition Nt + 1 = Nt(1 + nt + 1) and Pt + 1 = Pt(1 + πt + 1). Further the Fisher identity defines
the relationship between real and nominal interest rates, i.e.  
Then dividing through both sides of (B3) by Nt + 1 and Pt + 1 yields
(B4)
where lower case letters denote real, per capita values (ρ denotes real resource revenues per capita, to
avoid confusion with the real interest rate, r). Note that 
reflects the real rate of interest, net of adjustment for population growth.
Equation (B4) defines a first-order difference equation that can be solved iteratively to obtain the
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The left-hand side is equal to the present value of resource-based expenditure plus the present value of
financial wealth at T+1 (the period after exhaustion of the resource base). The right-hand side is equal
to the government’s total wealth at time 0, i.e. initial financial assets a0 plus the present value of the
stream of resource revenues.
Let g* represent the maximum level of real, per capita expenditure out of resource wealth which can be
sustained indefinitely. By assumption rt = r and nt = n for t ≥T. Thus, from (B4) we have
Furthermore, sustainability requires after exhaustion that aT + 2 = aT + 1. Substituting into the expression
above yields
which upon solving yields
Note that this expression reflects the standard annuity formula, adjusted for per capita terms. Now
substituting for g
R
k and aT+1 in (B5), we obtain our solution for g*:
Interpretation of this expression is easier in the special case when rt=r and nt=n in all periods. In that case,
The expression in square brackets is the government’s total wealth at time 0, while the preceding
expression in parentheses is the standard annuity formula (adjusted for population growth). Thus we
have g* equal to permanent income. 
In fact, our calculation of g* is altered by the continued flow of diversified revenues after the
exhaustion date. As explained in Appendix A, these are revenues of upstream and downstream
industries which have managed to diversify away from dependence on the domestic oil and gas sector.
Until T, we include these revenues in the measure of total resource revenues, ρt. However, after T, we
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industries which have managed to diversify away from dependence on the domestic oil and gas sector.
Until T, we include these revenues in the measure of total resource revenues, ρt. However, after T, we
must account for them separately. We denote these post-exhaustion revenues as v, and we conjecture the
level to be constant in per capita terms. (In any event, our forecast of population growth is zero after
2058.) In practice, the adjustment is easily made. We replace g* in equations (B6), (B6') and (B6'') with
g*-v and then proceed as above. The solution for g* is now
the only difference being the addition of the term
to the numerator. This term is simply the present value of the indefinite stream of v, starting at T and
discounted back to 0. Thus the government’s total resource wealth (the numerator) is increased by this
amount. 
The exercises we perform are purely partial in nature, in that they do not take into account the
feedback that alternative savings policies would have on the economy. It is not clear to us that this
represents a major omission. The main effect of alternative policies would be to impose greater restraint
on government spending in some periods and less restraint in others. Since the Alberta economy is
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Our estimate of the fiscal plan under the Permanent Resource Income Model (PRIM) depends upon
the forecasted values of uncertain variables, including resource prices, reserve size, annual production
rates, royalty rates, the indirect revenue multiplier (IRM), the diversification rate (DR), the real interest
rate and annual population growth. Appendix A presents reference forecasts for these variables, as well
as high and low forecasts for selected variables to be subjected to sensitivity analysis. We have presented
the results based upon the reference forecast in the main body of the text. Here we consider the impacts
of adopting the higher or lower forecasts.
Certain regularities emerge. For example, resource prices, reserve size, production rates and royalty
rates affect the fiscal plan symmetrically through their role in determining the government’s resource
revenues. Therefore, it is not necessary to subject them to sensitivity analysis separately. For our
purposes, we focus on resource prices within this group. In addition, we test the impact of IRM, DR,
the real interest rate and population growth.
Table C1 shows the impacts of high and low forecasts of the variables individually (partial sensitivity
analysis) as well as two combined scenarios. The impacts are summarized both in terms of the constant
value of GR per capita that the model generates and in the near-term savings required. Savings are
expressed as a percent of direct resource revenues during the five-year period 2007-2011. The “highest
GR case” corresponds with high resource prices, high IRM, high DR, high rate of return and low
population growth. The “lowest GR case” is defined symmetrically. 
High prices, high IRM and high DR all contribute to high wealth through the present value of
resource revenues. The rate of return has two opposite influences. First, a higher rate of return translates
into lower present values ceteris paribus and thus lower wealth at any given time. Second, a higher rate
of return increases the expenditure possibilities from any given level of wealth. From our experiments,
we see that the second effect dominates, as a higher rate of return generates a higher value of GR per
capita in the model. Finally, population growth affects GR per capita in an inverse fashion, as expected.
Appendix C: Sensitivity Analysis




(% of direct resource revenue)
reference case 4,501 139
partial sensitivity analysis
resource prices — high 5,439 111
resource prices — low  3,564 171
IRM — high 4,872 150
IRM — low 3,870 119
DR — high 4,713 134
DR — low 4,185 145
real interest rate — high 5,015 124
real interest rate — low 3,832 158
pop — high 4,449 141
pop — low 4,933 123
highest GR case 6,884 87
lowest GR case 2,339 158| 28 Commentary 263
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Table C1 indicates that, while numerical values vary, the qualitative features of our results are quite
robust. In particular, the required near-term savings under PRIM (2007-2011) exceeds direct resource
revenues in all cases except the highest GR case. This exception is not surprising, since it corresponds
with a case in which government wealth is extremely high and much of it accrues in the future. It
follows that some of the burden of saving is shifted forward in this case. Yet, even this scenario implies
an aggressive near-term savings program by historical standards (87 percent of direct resource revenues).
In contrast, we noted earlier that in the reference case the Fiscal Responsibility Act entails a near-term
savings rate of only 47 percent of direct revenues. Thus, we conclude that the requirement of an
aggressive savings program under PRIM is robust to changes in the underlying variables.Alberta. 2007. Alberta Budget 2007. Ministry of Finance. 
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